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The Basis for the Implication  
of Powers of International Organizations
Introduction
A previous edition of the Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review con-
tained my article on the doctrine of implied powers of international or-
ganizations in the case law of international tribunals.1 In its conlusion, 
a claim was formulated that the case law of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) formed, 
and still form, the intellectual basis for the analysis of issues concerning 
the implied powers of international organizations in the doctrine of inter-
national law. This article is the continuation of considerations on the topic 
of implied powers of international organizations, with a particular focus 
on the basis of the implication of such powers. 
Undoubtedly, any academic discussion on this matter must ac-
knowledge the nature of these powers as being additional to the powers 
expressly granted in constituent instruments. These expressly granted 
powers therefore form the first basis for implying additional powers. 
Another basis for implying powers is provided by the purposes and 
functions of a given international organization. Both these bases were 
referred to in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU), but it is worth pointing out that the Court preferred the latter 
and quoted express powers much less frequently. This is undobtedly 
connected with the concept of functional necessity. It should be noted, 
1 A. Gadkowski, The doctrine of implied powers of international organizations in the case law of 
international tribunals, “Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review” 2016, vol. 6, pp. 45–59.
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however, that the preference for using the purposes and functions of 
an international organization when implying its powers carries certain 
risks. In this context, Krzysztof Skubiszewski points to situations where 
it is impossible to separate the purposes and functions of an international 
organization from its existing powers, which, in practice, makes it im-
possible to treat these powers and functions alone as a sufficient basis 
for implication.2 In practice such a situation clearly results in limiting 
the doctrine of implied powers.
For example, Manuel Rama-Montaldo, who himself is no supporter of 
a strict differentiation between the functions and powers of international 
organizations, is of the opinion that the statutes of most international orga-
nizations “do not draw any such distinction between function and powers, 
and either use those words indiscriminately or else rather tend to use the 
word function.”3 The UN Charter is a good example of this. 
Luigi Ferrari Bravo and Andrea Giardina, who thoroughly dis-
cussed this matter in the context of the Treaty on the European Commu-
nity (TEC), also identify the concept of implied functions. In the com-
ments on Article 235 of the TEC and based on the analysis of the 1962 
Certain expenses ICJ advisory opinion4, they argue that while implied 
powers are used to perform functions that have already been assigned to 
the organization, the concept of implied functions refers to those tasks 
of this organization which, although not expressly assigned to it, are 
“necessary for the fulfilment of its ends.”5 
It can be said therefore, that the functions of an international or-
ganization are related to the essence of its activity and, by extension, 
2 K. Skubiszewski, Implied Powers of International Organizations, in: International Law 
at a Time of Perplexity. Essays in Honour of Shabatai Rosenne, ed. Y. Dinstein, Dordrecht 
1989, p. 857.
3 M. Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International 
Organizations, “44 British Yearbook of International Law” 1970, p. 151. 
4 Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory 
Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 157 et seq.
5 L. Ferrari Bravo, A. Giardina, Commentario al Trattato Istitutivo della CEE, vol. III, Mi-
lano 1965, p. 1702; M. Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality…, p. 150.
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to the tasks it fulfils. Powers, on the other hand, by their very nature 
concentrate on measures which are taken by the organization and which 
produce certain legal effects, both for the organization itself and its 
member states. There is also no doubt about the connection between the 
functions and powers of an international organization. This relationship 
may be illustrated by the concept of implied powers. Implied powers 
are, after all, powers which, although additional, are necessary or essen-
tial for the performance of the organization’s statutory functions. 
A broad definition or determination of the functions and purposes 
of an organization in its statute is certainly beneficial from the point of 
view of assuming additional powers, such as implied powers. In order 
to imply real and effective additional powers, however, it is important 
that the constituent instrument provide the international organization 
with a certain catalogue of express powers and a mechanism for im-
plying these additional powers. International organizations operate in 
a dynamic international reality. Their statutes often comprise provisions 
that retain their initial form and shape for decades, despite substantial 
changes in the international environment. As we know, so far it has been 
impossible to review the United Nations (UN) Charter, whose provi-
sions have hardly changed for 70 years. Implying additional powers is, 
therefore, necessary to ensure that the organization exercises the powers 
expressly granted to it and fulfils its statutory purposes and functions. 
The Purposes and Functions  
of International Organizations 
as the Basis for Implication
In practice, the definition of the purposes, tasks and functions of inter-
national organizations in their constituent instruments is often extremely 
broad. The real meaning of these terms is consequently often unclear and 
results in many possible interpretations acting as bases for the implication 
of powers of international organizations. One needs therefore to highlight 
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selected decisions of international courts, in which these courts based im-
plied powers on the purposes and functions of international organizations. 
In the Work of the Employer case, the PCIJ stated that the International La-
bour Organization (ILO) would be prevented from “the accomplishment 
of [its] end”6, i.e. the protection of workers and the ensuring of accept-
able labour conditions, if the organization could not regulate incidentally 
the work performed by the employers. The Court’s position on the matter, 
however, was based on more extensive reasoning. It also cited the intention 
of the states parties to the Treaty of Versailles and the interpretation of the 
Treaty’s provisions.7 Another PCIJ opinion, the Danube advisory opin-
ion, contains references to the limits of the functions expressly bestowed 
upon the European Commission of the Danube. More precisely, the Court 
held that the European Commission as “an international institution with 
a special purpose […] only has the functions bestowed upon it by the 
Definitive Statute with a view to the fulfilment of that purpose, but it has 
power to exercise these functions to their full extent.”8 
An interesting reference to the purposes and functions of an interna-
tional organization was made by the ICJ in the well-known 1949 Repa-
ration for injuries case. In this advisory opinion, the Court used general 
language to justify the UN’s power to bring international claims. Based 
on the assumption that the organization is an international legal person, 
the Court stated that “the rights and duties of an entity such as the Or-
ganization must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or 
implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.”9 
6 Competence of the ILO to regulate Incidentally the Personal Work of the Employer, 
PCIJ Publications 1926, Series B – No. 14, p. 18.
7 For an analysis of this opinion, see J. Makarczyk, The International Court of Justice on the 
Implied Powers of International Organizations, in: Essays in International Law in Honour 
of Judge Manfred Lachs, ed. J. Makarczyk, The Hague 1984, p. 506. 
8 Jurisdiction of the European Commission if the Danube between Galatz and Braila, 
PCIJ Publications 1927, Series B – No. 14, p. 64. 
9 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports 1949, p. 180. 
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Consequently, the ICJ elaborated on its position stating: “the Or-
ganization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not 
expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary 
implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.”10 
It should be noted that the view presented in this opinion was later 
reflected in the Effect of awards case. In this advisory opinion, the ICJ 
implied the power to establish an administrative tribunal as follows: 
“[t]he power to establish a tribunal, to do justice as between the Organi-
zation and the Staff members, was essential to ensure the efficient work-
ing of Secretariat […] capacity to do this arises by necessary intendment 
out of the Charter.”11 The ICJ also referred to the statutory purposes of 
an organization in the Certain expenses case. In its interpretation of the 
UN Charter, the Court concluded that “when the Organization takes ac-
tion which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfil-
ment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presump-
tion is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.”12
Another reference to the UN’s functions regarding the trusteeship 
system may be found in the Status of South West Africa advisory opin-
ion. The ICJ implied the UN’s supervisory power over the South West 
African territory, even though the territory had not been placed in the 
trusteeship system. In this case the ICJ relied on the necessity for super-
vision. According to the Court, “[t]he necessity for supervision contin-
ues to exist despite the disappearance of the supervisory organ under the 
Mandates system. It cannot be admitted that the obligation to submit to 
supervision has disappeared merely because the supervisory organ has 
ceased to exist, when the United Nations has another international organ 
performing similar, though not identical, supervisory functions.”13 Fi-
10 Ibidem, p. 182. For an analysis of this opinion, see for example: B. Conforti, C. Focarelli, 
The Law and Practice of the United Nations, The Hague 2005, p. 13 et seq. 
11 Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1954, p. 57. 
12 Certain expenses case, op. cit., p. 168. 
13 International status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 136.
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nally, in the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict case, the ICJ cited the criteria of implying powers previously 
used in the Reparation for injuries and Effect of awards cases. It con-
cluded that implied powers signify “powers which […] are conferred 
upon [the Organization] by necessary implication as being essential to 
the performance of its duties.”14 
It should be emphasized that the ICJ did not, however, accept the 
WHO’s power to request an advisory opinion. The ICJ held that “it does 
not seem to the Court that the provisions of Article 2 of the WHO 
Constitution [which determine the functions of the WHO] […] can be 
understood as conferring upon the Organization a competence to ad-
dress the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, and thus in turn a com-
petence to ask the Court about that.”15 
In addition, one should also note an interesting construct introduced in 
the Namibia case. Here, the Court sought the power to revoke a mandate 
when no such power was expressly stipulated in any of the applicable inter-
national instruments. It would seem that, since the ICJ could not imply pow-
ers from those expressly stated in the treaties, it would seek such powers in 
the purposes and functions of the organization. The Court chose, however, 
to justify its position differently, and it stated that “[t]he silence of a treaty 
as to existence of such right cannot be interpreted as implying the exclusion 
of a right which has its source outside of the treaty, in general international 
law, and is dependent on the occurrence of circumstances which are not 
normally envisaged when a treaty is concluded.”16 In his analysis of this 
opinion, Skubiszewski points out the ICJ ‘presumption’ in this context.17 
In conclusion, the ICJ stated: “[t]hat this special right of appeal was not in-
14 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports 1996, p. 79, para. 25. 
15 Ibidem, para. 21.
16 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports 1971, p. 47, para. 96. 
17 K. Skubiszewski, Implied Powers…, p. 865; J. Makarczyk, The International Court of Jus-
tice…, p. 510. 
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serted in the Covenant cannot be interpreted as excluding the application of 
the general principle of law according to which a power of termination on 
account of breach, even if unexpressed, must be presumed to exist as inher-
ent in any mandate, as indeed in any agreement.”18
In this context, one should also refer to the case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which provides examples of deci-
sions in which powers of the Community were implied from its purposes 
and functions. It should be noted that the Court was just as cautious about 
using this basis for the implication of powers as the ICJ had been. Implying 
the Community’s powers based on the Court’s case law was not, in fact, 
of great importance because, as the author emphasised earlier, in Commu-
nity law, similarly to EU law today, there was a mechanism for determin-
ing new powers under Article 308 of the TEC (Article 352 of the Treaty 
of the Functionning of the European Union (TFEU)). Some decisions of 
the Court are nevertheless worthy of attention and as such are frequently 
cited in the literature. The present author shall discuss several of these by 
way of example only. In one of the earliest decisions, the 8/55 Fédéra-
tion Charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority case, the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) implied certain powers of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) from the objectives of the constituent treaty. It must 
be emphasised, however, that the Court relied on this basis for implica-
tion in a subsidiary way only and the implied powers were, in fact, based 
on the express powers of the organization. The Court expressed its view as 
follows: “without having recourse to a wide interpretation it is possible to 
apply a rule of interpretation generally accepted in both international and 
national law, according to which the rules laid down by an international 
treaty or a law presuppose the rules without which that treaty or law would 
have no meaning or could not be reasonably and usefully applied.”19 
18 Namibia case, op. cit., p. 48, para. 98. 
19 C-8/55 Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v. High Authority of the European Coal and 
Steel Community [1954–1956], ECR-292, p. 299. 
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The CJEU also formulated its stance on the matter in the most fre-
quently cited judgment in this context, the ERTA case. In this case the 
Court stressed the need to consider the whole scheme of the EEC Treaty 
when implying powers, and invoked the transport-related objectives of 
the Treaty in order to demonstrate the existence of the external powers 
of the Community, i.e. its powers to conclude agreements in this regard. 
The Court concluded that this authority of the Community arises “not 
only from an express conferment by the Treaty […] but may equally flow 
from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within 
the framework of those provisions, by the Community institutions.”20
The Express Powers of International 
Organizations as the Basis for Implication
To start with, one may say that powers of international organizations 
expressly granted in their constituent instruments would seem to be 
a sufficient basis for implying further powers. These further powers will 
clearly be additional powers, i.e. subsidiary to express powers. No com-
prehensive statutory allocation of the powers of international organiza-
tions is possible and international organizations operate in a dynamic 
and constantly changing international reality, which means that exer-
cising their express powers exactly as provided for in their constituent 
instruments may raise concerns. A response to such a new reality might 
clearly be provided by amending the statute. As the example of the sub-
sequent EU Treaties shows, not only may one in this way change the 
legal status of an international organization, but one may also modify 
its powers. On the other hand, the example of the UN demonstrates 
that, when faced with the lack of political will to introduce significant 
changes to the statute, the organization must operate in this new en-
vironment often based on outdated or ineffective statutory provisions. 
In such a case the powers that are implied from previously granted origi-
20 C-22/70 Commission v. Council (ERTA case) [1971], ECR-263, para. 16. 
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nal powers offer a solution that, in practice, allows the performance of 
the statutory purposes of the organization. As in the UN Charter there is 
no mechanism for creating new powers based on existing powers (such 
as in Article 352 of the TFEU) for this organization and the implication 
of powers, especially those regarding external relations, may add a new 
meaning to the previously granted express powers. 
When it comes to the ICJ stance on this matter, one should note the 
Court’s lack of enthusiasm with regard to implying the UN’s powers in this 
way and justifying implied powers with powers expressly granted. This 
view of the ICJ is illustrated by the Reparation for injuries case. When 
implying the powers of the UN in order to bring international claims for 
damage, the ICJ relied on the purposes and functions of the organization 
and stated that “the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organiza-
tion must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied 
in its constituent documents and developed in practice.”21 
It is worth noting that the ICJ’s position was not unanimous, as dem-
onstrated by the dissenting opinion of Judge Hackworth, who sought to 
limit any implication of the powers of this international organization 
to existing powers alone. In this particular case, he based the author-
ity of the UN to make such claims on the express provisions relating 
to the competences and capacities of the organization provided for in 
Articles 104 and 105 of the UN Charter and the 1946 Convention of the 
Privileges and Immunities of the UN. In this context, Judge Hackworth 
stressed that if the organization was able to exercise these capacities and 
competences, it must also “be able to assert claims on its own behalf.” 
Therefore, “the organization must have and does have ample authority 
to take needful steps for its protection against wrongful acts for which 
Member States are responsible.”22 The essence of Judge Hackworth‘s 
view regarding the implication of powers is captured by the following 
statement: “[p]owers not expressed cannot freely be implied. Implied 
21 Reparation for injuries case, op. cit., p. 180. 
22 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hackworth, Reparation for injuries case, op. cit., pp. 196–197.
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powers flow from a grant of expressed powers, and are limited to those 
that are ‘necessary’ to the exercise of powers expressly granted.”23
It could be said that the relevance of Judge Hackworth’s doubts over 
the possibility of implying the powers of international organizations seem 
to persist today. According to the author of this work, this is demonstrated 
by the fact that the international instruments of some international au-
thorities substantially limit the scope of what may be implied in their 
functioning. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
provides an apt example of this. Article 157(2), which delimits the powers 
of the International Seabed Authority, stipulates that “[t]he powers and 
functions of the Authority shall be those expressly conferred upon it by 
the Convention. The Authority shall have such incidental powers, con-
sistent with the Convention, as are implicit in, and necessary for, the exer-
cise of those powers and functions with respect to activities in the Area.”24 
The provisions of this article allow, albeit to a limited extent, the use of 
implied powers. In this particular case, the capacity of the International 
Seabed Authority (ISA) to imply powers depends on whether the power 
in question is based on the provisions of the Convention and whether it is 
necessary with respect to the ISA’s activities. 
If we are to refer this stance to the position taken by the CJEU, then, 
similar to the ICJ advisory opinion in the Reparation for injuries case, 
which reflects the somewhat unclear position of the ICJ on the doc-
trine of implied powers, in the CJEU case law an example is provid-
ed by the afore-mentioned ERTA case. Even the earlier decision in the 
8/55 Fédération Charabonnière case indicates that the Court, when 
implying powers of the ECSC, relied both on the express powers of 
this organization and, in a subsidiary way, on its purposes and func-
tions. The Court applied an interpretation according to which the rules 
of an international agreement presuppose the existence of rules “with-
out which that treaty or law would have no meaning or could not be 
23 Ibidem, p. 198.
24 United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), vol. 1833, p. 3.
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reasonably and usefully applied.”25 In contrast, in the classic opinion 
of the ERTA case the CJEU implied the powers of the Community to 
conclude agreements on transport from its express powers, but it also 
referred to the whole scheme and the objectives of the Treaty. The es-
sence of the Court’s view on the matter boils down to the statement that 
the Community’s power in question exists not only if it is expressly 
stated in the specific provisions of the Treaty, but may also “flow from 
other provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the 
framework of those provisions, by the Community institutions.”26 
In consequence, the Court then elaborated and concluded that, if the 
Community has internal competence, it follows that it also has external 
competence, a fact usually referred to as the principle of parallelism.27 
When elaborating on this doctrine, the Court also imposed limits on such 
implications of external powers and introduced to the principle of paral-
lelism the test of necessity. In its developed form, this test means that 
the attainment of specific objectives of the TEC in the external sphere 
must be inextricably connected with the performance of internal acts in 
a given field of co-operation.28
Concluding Remarks
Based on the decisions of international courts, as discussed above, we 
may observe that implying the powers of international organizations from 
their expressly granted powers entails certain problems. When relying on 
expressly granted powers, such as the basis for implying the powers of in-
ternational organizations in external relations, the courts also usually indi-
cated other conditions that prevented free implication of powers. The pro-
25 C- 8/55 Fédération Charbonnière… p. 299. 
26 ERTA case, op. cit, p. 274, para. 16. 
27 See Opinion 1/76 Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland wa-
terway vessels [1977], ECR-741. 
28 Opinion 1/94 Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements con-
cerning services and the protection of intellectual property Art 228 (6) of the EC Treaty 
[1994], ECR I-5267
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cess of implying the powers of international organizations must be applied 
with caution, but this category of powers of international organizations in 
external relations has been established in practice. Contrary to Finn Seyer-
sted’s opinion, it is certainly no fiction.29 Implying the powers of various 
entities is never easy, regardless of whether international law, EU law or 
national law is involved. The judgment on the McCulloch case, which 
initiated the doctrine of implied powers, also points to potential and real 
problems faced by the US Supreme Court in this case.30
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SUMMARY
The Basis for the Implication  
of Powers of International Organizations
The aim of this article is to present the basis of the implication of powers 
of international organizations. This topic is not only of great interest and 
import from the point of view of the theory of international organizaiza-
tions, but also from that of the practice of international organizations, 
particularly important institutions of international cooperation. The au-
thor discusses the nature of the basis for such implication before then 
examining the implication of powers within the context of international 
organizations’ expressly granted powers. 
Keywords: International organizations, International Court of Justice, 
Permanent Court of Intrenational Justice, Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union, powers of international organizations.
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